翻訳と辞書 Words near each other ・ Generation of 1928 ・ Generation of Animals ・ Generation of binomial series using calculus ・ Generation of Chaos ・ Generalized Pochhammer symbol ・ Generalized Poincaré conjecture ・ Generalized polygon ・ Generalized processor sharing ・ Generalized Procrustes analysis ・ Generalized pustular psoriasis ・ Generalized quadrangle ・ Generalized quantifier ・ Generalized randomized block design ・ Generalized relative entropy ・ Generalized Riemann hypothesis ・ Generalized second-price auction ・ Generalized selection ・ Generalized semi-infinite programming ・ Generalized signal averaging ・ Generalized singular value decomposition ・ Generalized spectrogram ・ Generalized star height problem ・ Generalized suffix tree ・ Generalized symmetric group ・ Generalized System of Preferences ・ Generalized taxicab number ・ Generalized Timing Formula ・ Generalized Tobit ・ Generalized tree alignment ・ Generalized trichoepithelioma Dictionary Lists mini英和辞書 mini和英辞書 Webster 1913 Latin-English FOLDOC Wikipedia English ウィキペディア

翻訳と辞書　辞書検索 [ 開発暫定版 ] スポンサード リンク Generalized second-price auction ： ウィキペディア英語版 Generalized second-price auction The generalized second-price auction (GSP) is a non-truthful auction mechanism for multiple items. Each bidder places a bid. The highest bidder gets the first slot, the second-highest, the second slot and so on, but the highest bidder pays the price bid by the second-highest bidder, the second-highest pays the price bid by the third-highest, and so on. First conceived as a natural extension of the Vickrey auction, it conserves some of the desirable properties of the Vickrey auction. It is used mainly in the context of keyword auctions, where sponsored search slots are sold on an auction basis. The first analyses of GSP are in the economics literature by Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz〔Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz: "(Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords )". American Economic Review 97(1), 2007 pp 242-259〕 and by Varian.〔H. R. Varian: "(Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2006 )".〕 It is employed by Google's AdWords technology. == Formal model == Suppose that there are $n$ bidders and slots. Each slot has a probability of being clicked of $\backslash alpha\_i$. We can assume that top slots have a larger probability of being clicked, so: : $\backslash alpha\_1\; \backslash geq\; \backslash alpha\_2\; \backslash geq\; \backslash cdots\; \backslash geq\; \backslash alpha\_k.\; \backslash ,$ We can think of $n-k$ additional virtual slots with click-through-rate zero, so, $\backslash alpha\_i\; =\; 0$ for $i\; >\; k$. Now, each bidder has an intrinsic value for one slot $v\_i$ submits a bid $b\_i$ indicating the maximum he is willing to pay for a slot (which is his bid reported valuation – notice it doesn't need to be the same as his true valuation $v\_i$). We order the bidders by their value, let's say: : $v\_1\; \backslash geq\; v\_2\; \backslash geq\; \backslash cdots\; \backslash geq\; v\_n,\; \backslash ,$ and charge each bidder a price $p\_i$ (this will be 0 if they didn't win a slot). Slots are sold in a pay-per-click model, so a bidder just pays for a slot if the user actually clicks in that slot. We say the utility of bidder $i$ when allocated to slot $j$ is $u\_i\; =\; \backslash alpha\_j\; (v\_i\; -\; p\_i)$. The total social welfare from owning or selling slots is given by: $\backslash sum\_j\; \backslash alpha\_j\; v\_$ where $\backslash pi(j)$ is the bidder allocated to slot $j$. The total revenue is given by: $\backslash sum\_i\; \backslash alpha\_i\; p\_i$ 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Generalized second-price auction」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク 翻訳と辞書 : 翻訳のためのインターネットリソース Copyright(C) kotoba.ne.jp 1997-2016. All Rights Reserved.